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Abstract
The effect of minority status on managerial survival in Major League Baseball
is analyzed using survival time analysis and data envelopment analysis. Efficiency
scores based on team performance and player salary data from 1985 to 2006 are
computed and included as covariates in a survival time analysis. It is shown that
when controlling for performance and personal characteristics minorities are on
average 9.6 percentage points more likely to return the following season. Additionally, it is shown that winning percentage has no impact on managerial survival
when efficiency is controlled for.
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Introduction
Due to the obsessively accurate and detailed record keeping of Major League
Baseball and the popularity of the sport, there exists a large amount of literature on
almost all aspects of the sport, including discrimination and managerial retention.
However, previous research has failed to link the two subjects by including race as a
factor when examining managerial retention in professional sports.

The analysis

presented in this paper looks to fill this gap in the literature by providing a thorough
analysis of the effects of minority status on managerial survival in Major League
Baseball.
On opening day of 2007 only six out of thirty Major League Baseball teams were
lead by minority managers. This represents only 20 percent of major league managers.
This low percentage of minority managers is very surprising given the great diversity of
players in Major League Baseball. Approximately 42 percent of major league players are
black, Hispanic, or Asian. One would expect a lower percentage of minority managers
than players as many minority players do not possess the English speaking skills required
to manage. However, a difference this large certainly deserves investigation. Even more
surprising than this relatively low percentage of minority managers, is the fact that for the
2007 season there was only one black manager in the major leagues. This is the lowest
number of black managers since Frank Robinson became the first black manager over 30
years ago in 1975. Not only is the number of black managers at an all time low, but the
number of minority managers has decreased significantly in recent years. From 2002 to
2007, the percentage of minority managers in the major leagues was reduced significantly
from its all-time high of 33 percent to 20 percent.
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This paper examines whether this recent downward trend in minority managers is
the result of minorities having a lower probability of survival than white managers. This
question is analyzed by applying survival time analysis and data envelopment analysis to
data on major league managers from 1985 through 2006. Through survival analysis, it
can be established whether or not minority status has a negative impact on the likelihood
of a manager returning for another season.
Previous Literature
The following studies are most directly related to survival analysis of major
league managers. Scully (1994) uses survival analysis to show that managerial retention
is influenced by managerial efficiency for the sports of baseball, basketball, and football.
However, Scully (1994) does not include other covariates in addition to managerial
efficiency. I improve upon his survival analysis by including covariates for various
characteristics including race. I also consider a wider range of underlying distributions
for the survival analysis in this paper. Scully (1994) uses a measurement of managerial
efficiency which is based on a comparison of a manager’s actual winning percentage to
an estimate of their maximum possible winning percentage. These maximum winning
percentages are estimated using ratios of a manager’s runs or points to his opponent’s
runs or points. The efficiency scores used in my analysis differ greatly from that of
Scully (1994) as I use a data envelopment analysis (DEA) approach. In this analysis
efficiencies measure a manager’s performance relative to the best performance possible
with his team’s given talent as measured by player salaries. Unlike Scully (1994), the
efficiency measure presented here does not rely on team scoring statistics, which could be
affected by the quality of management. The DEA approach presented here is similar to

3

that of Einolf (2004). However, I choose a different measure of output and include a
negative input for the level of competition a team faces.
Fizel and D’Itri (1997) use probit estimation to study the impact of organizational
performance on manager succession in 147 college basketball teams from 1984 to 1991.
They use data envelopment analysis to measure managerial efficiency based on team
talent and the strength of the opposition. As with the other previous studies Fizel and
D’Itri (1997) do not include race in their analysis.

They find that when winning

percentage is included managerial efficiency does not have a significant impact. Using
survival time analysis instead of probit estimation I find the opposite to be true for Major
League Baseball. The advantage of survival time analysis over probit is that it allows the
effect of the covariates to vary depending on the year of tenure being considered. This is
desirable in this context as there is no reason to assume the effects of race would be the
same in a manager’s first year as in their tenth year.
Survival analysis is used by Audas, Dobson, and Goddard (1999) to examine the
effects of various performance and descriptive variables on the tenure of English soccer
coaches using individual game data from 1972 to 1997. While Audas et al. (1999) do
utilize the Cox proportional hazard model, which is the model of choice in this study,
they also do not include race as a covariate. Additionally, they use the team’s league
standing when the manager started his tenure to capture differences in the talent available
to the manager.

The data envelopment analysis presented in this study captures

differences in talent through the use of player salaries. This data envelopment analysis
measure is more appropriate for professional baseball as managers are not in charge of
acquiring and exchanging players as they traditionally are in European soccer.

4

Variable Selection
For this analysis the dependent variable of interest is whether or not a manager
returns for another season. This analysis treats all terminations equally and does not
differentiate between voluntary and involuntary terminations. It is not uncommon in
professional baseball for a manager to be allowed to resign from his job in order to save
his reputation.

This makes distinguishing between voluntary and involuntary

terminations extremely difficult. Therefore, the dependent variable in this analysis is
equal to zero for any season after which the manager returns to manage the same team
and one for any season after which the manager does not return to coach the same team.
Managers are included in the analysis so long as they managed more than five
consecutive games in a given season. The goal of this restriction is to eliminate those
managers who were not actually being considered for retention, such as those filling in
for an absent manager or during the transition to a new manager.

There is no specific

number of games which signals a manager is being considered for retention but it is safe
to say those managing less than six games are not being considered for retention. Raising
this restriction to 50 games would only eliminate 5 out of 87 minority observations and
does not affect the conclusions of this analysis. Therefore, the author chooses to only
eliminate those who are most obviously not under consideration for retention without fear
that this restriction is driving the results of the analysis.
The dependent variable or probability of returning in the next season is expected
to be influenced by both the manager’s performance and by individual characteristics of
the manager and team. The first and most important job of a manager is to win games.
Therefore, it is expected that some measure of team wins would have a significant
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positive impact on the probability that a manager returns the following season. The
winning percentage for each team during the portion of the year that the manager was
with that team is used to measure this ability to win. Winning percentage is chosen over
total wins as it makes comparisons between managing spells of different lengths possible.
While regular season wins are important, the ultimate goal of a team is not to win
regular season games but rather to win the World Series. Therefore, playoff wins are also
expected to influence managerial survival. In order to measure a manager’s playoff
success, wins in the League Championship Series and World Series are also included in
the survival analysis. Wins in the Division Series are not included in this analysis as the
division series did not exist prior to the 1995 season.
While winning is the most important thing to baseball fans, owners must also
consider profits. Due to these financial restrictions some managers may be given less
talent to work with than others. When faced with one of these low budget rosters there is
only so much a manager can do to make a team win. If a team has more talent than other
teams and still loses it is likely that people will look at the management as a source of the
problem. However, if a team with no talent loses it is unlikely that the manager will be
blamed. Therefore, a more appropriate measure of manager performance may be how
efficiently the manager transforms his given resources into wins. Efficiency scores for
managers can be calculated using data envelopment analysis and then included in the
survival analysis to control for managerial performance.

The specifics of the data

envelopment analysis are discussed in the next section.
It is obvious that managerial survival is not completely based on wins and league
standing. In some cases the decision to retain or fire a manager may be based on personal
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characteristics and qualifications. One important characteristic is the experience of a
manager. It is expected that years spent in baseball as a coach or player will increase a
manager’s baseball specific human capital and therefore make them a better coach. Such
increases in on the field performance should be captured by the efficiency measure.
However, experience may also improve skills not captured by the efficiency measure,
such as the ability to communicate with the press and interact with front office personnel.
For this reason it is expected that experience as a manager should increase the likelihood
of retention beyond its contribution to efficiency. It is also expected that as experience
increases its returns in terms of human capital may diminish as the probability of learning
something new decreases with years spent around baseball. In order to capture the
effects of this human capital on the probability of survival, games as a manager at the
Major League level are included in the analysis. The square of this variable is also
included to capture the expected diminishing effects.
Similarly to experience, one would expect that age also influences the probability
of a manager returning for the next season. The amount of information and experiences a
manager has been exposed to in and out of baseball increases with age. Any useful
information or experience outside of managing games would not be captured by the
experience variable. This would lead one to expect a positive relationship between age
and retention. However, as age increases it is also more likely that a manager will choose
to retire. It may also be expected that as managers’ ages increase they are less able to
relate to young players and will therefore be less effective. This increased likelihood of
retirement and inability to relate to young players leads to a negative relationship
between age and retention. To capture these effects and determine whether they are
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positive or negative managers’ ages, in years, are calculated and included in the analysis.
As with experience we would expect that the benefits of age would diminish with time
and the likelihood of retirement would increase with age and so the square of age is also
included in the analysis.
The personal characteristic of interest in this analysis is the manager’s minority
status. A variable which is equal to one for Black and Hispanic managers and zero
otherwise is included to capture this effect.

If minorities face discrimination in

managerial retention decisions, one would expect to observe a negative relationship
between this variable and the probability of survival.
Measuring Efficiency with Data Envelopment Analysis
In order to evaluate how efficiently a manager turns his team’s potential into wins
the method of data envelopment analysis can be applied. This application differs little
from the use of data envelopment analysis in productivity analysis of firms.

In

productivity analysis firms take inputs and transform them into outputs. These outputs
are compared to a constructed production possibilities frontier in order to determine how
efficient the firm is. The analysis presented here is based on the output oriented technical
efficiency method presented by Banker, Charnes, and Cooper (1984).
The production frontier is based on three assumptions about the production
technology. The first assumption is that inputs are freely disposable. This means that if a
certain level of inputs can produce some level of output, then a level of inputs which is
greater in at least one dimension can also produce that level of output. The second
assumption is that output is freely disposable. This implies that if a certain level of inputs
can produce some level of output, then that same level of inputs can also produce any
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lower level of output.

The third assumption is the convexity of the production

possibilities set. Convexity implies that any linear combination of two feasible points is
also feasible.
This production frontier can be shown graphically for the one input one output
case. Given a set of observed points it is possible to show all points which are feasible.
The convexity assumption means that all points which are linear combinations of the
observed points are possible. Graphically, this is shown by connecting the data points to
create a convex hull. The assumption of free disposability of inputs implies that all
points to the right of the convex hull are feasible. Similarly the assumption of free
disposability of output implies that all points below a feasible point are possible. When
these assumptions are combined the result is a production possibility set as seen in the
following figure.
DEA Production Possibilities Frontier

Output

C

B

A
Input

In order to measure how efficiently a firm, or in this case manager, is producing,
their actual output can be compared to the maximum feasible output given that level of
inputs. This is referred to as the output oriented technical efficiency. This measure of
efficiency is most appropriate in this analysis as managers have limited ability to choose
their inputs as building the team is the job of the general manager. Therefore, the
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question of interest is how much more could the manager have produced given his inputs
rather than how much could inputs have been reduced given the managers output. The
technical efficiency is measured by the firms actual output divided by the maximum
feasible output for that level of inputs. In the above chart, for observation B, this is the
distance from A to B divided by the distance from A to C.
In the case of baseball managers, the output of interest is wins. However, due to
the fact that not all managers manage an entire season and not all seasons have had the
same number of games wins are not comparable from one observation to the next. This
problem is avoided by measuring output in terms of winning percentage. For this data
envelopment analysis playoff wins are not included as managers who are given teams of
very low ability will likely not have the possibility of producing any playoff wins.
Therefore, only regular season performance is included in this analysis.

However,

playoff wins are included in the survival analysis presented in the next section.
While the output of interest seems very obvious and easy to calculate the inputs
are much more difficult. The inputs of interest are the players a manager is given. More
specifically the inputs are the amount of talent which a manager has to work with. This
talent can come in many forms, such as hitting, fielding, pitching, and speed. These
talents are traditionally measure through statistics such as batting average, earned run
average, and runs scored. However, in this context using measures of player performance
is inappropriate. This is due to the fact that a player’s individual performance over a
season is likely to be influenced by the quality of the manager. A good manager may
cause a pitcher to have a lower ERA than a bad manager. If input is measured in terms of
ERA then the measure will always be overstating the level of input for good managers
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and understating the level of input for bad managers. Simply using performance statistics
from prior seasons would not eliminate this problem for those players who have only
played under one manager. Additionally, past statistics would not exist for any players
who are in their first season at the major league level.
What is needed is a measure of player potential independent of the influence of
the manager. It is reasonable to assume that teams pay players based on how they expect
them to perform. This level of pay is determined before the player actually plays that
season and therefore should not be influenced by the manager’s performance that season.
Due to contracting issues, such as free agency, player salaries are not an exact measure of
player potential. However, they are the only measure of talent which is observable
independent of managerial performance for all players.

Based on this logic player

salaries are used as inputs to the production of winning percentage. This means that the
output oriented efficiency will measure how efficiently a manager produced wins given
his set of player salaries. This is precisely the measure of performance which is expected
to determine whether a manager is retained for the next season.
Due to data limitations and for simplicity of analysis the salaries are divided into
offensive salaries and defensive salaries. For offense, the salaries of the players who
played the greatest number of games at each infield position and the top three outfielders
in games played are summed for each team of each year from 1985 to 2006. Due to the
presence of the designated hitter in the American League the analysis must be done
separately for the National and American Leagues. When calculating the efficiencies for
the American League the designated hitter salary is also included as an offensive salary.
For defense, the salaries of the top five pitchers in terms of games started and the top six
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pitchers in terms of relief appearances are summed for each team of each year. Player
salaries are available for the years 1985 on from several online sources, including
espn.com, usatoday.com, and the Sean Lahman Baseball Database.
While the potential of a team reflected in its salaries is an important input it is not
the only constraint which a manager faces. The level of talent on opposing teams will act
as a negative input. If two managers have identical teams and one plays against better
competition, that manager cannot be expected to win as much. Therefore, a negative
input for the salary of the competition is included in the analysis. Major League teams
play the majority of their games against teams within their division. Therefore, the
negative input is calculated as the average total salary of the other teams in a given
team’s division. With this variable included, both measures of the potential a manager is
given and the potential he is expected to compete against are taken into consideration.
As any baseball fan knows baseball salaries have grown rapidly over the past
several decades. Therefore, in order to compare inputs from different seasons the salaries
must be adjusted for the rapid increase in the level of Major League salaries.

To

accomplish this, a price index is created by calculating the average player salary for each
season from 1985 to 2006 and dividing the 2006 average salary by that of the other
seasons. This index, presented below, is used to adjust all player salaries into 2006
baseball dollars.
Baseball Salary Price Index
Year
Multiple
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
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5.9531
6.7943
6.5175
6.2569
5.6078
5.5383
3.1781
2.7059
2.9013
2.7006

1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006

2.9374
2.7602
2.3236
2.2130
1.9084
1.4222
1.2433
1.1847
1.1014
1.1376
1.0762
1.0000

With the inputs and outputs defined the output oriented technical efficiency can
be calculated. This is done by solving the following maximization problem and taking
the inverse of the resulting value of θ. θ can be interpreted as the multiple by which
output can be increased using a feasible combination of observed inputs. The subscript 0
identifies values for the team being analyzed. The subscript i identifies the other teams in
the comparison group. W, O, D, and C represents winning percentage, offense, defense,
and competition respectively.
Maximize

θ

Subject to:

(1) ∑λiWi ≥ θW0
(2) ∑λiOi ≤ O0
(3) ∑λiDi ≤ D0
(4) ∑λiCi ≥ C0
(5) ∑λi = 1
(6) λi ≥ 0

Constraint (1) implies that the combination of other observed winning percentages
must be greater than or equal to the observed winning percentage of the manager being
evaluated. Constraints (2) and (3) imply that the combination of offensive and defensive
inputs must be less than the inputs of the manager under consideration. Equation (4)
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states that the combination of the negative competition inputs must be at least as great as
the competition faced by the manager being evaluated. Constraint (5) implies variable
returns to scale by eliminating scaled down versions of one input bundle from the
feasibility set. The last constraint simply assures that there are no negative inputs.
The fact that W0 is a feasible level of output assures that the maximum value of θ
will be greater than 1. Therefore, the technical efficiency, or percentage of feasible
output which is being produced, is the inverse of θ. Because θ is greater than 1 this
number will always lie in the closed interval from 0 to 1. For example, if a manager has
an efficiency score of 0.8 his winning percentage is 80% of what could have been
achieved by a linear combination of other observations which has the same or lesser
inputs.
The output oriented efficiency is calculated for each manager for each season
from 1986 to 2005 for both the American and National Leagues. In order to increase the
number of comparison input output combinations, for each season each manager is
evaluated compared to all managers in that year along with the previous and following
seasons. For example, for the Philadelphia Phillies in 2005 Charlie Manuel is evaluated
relative to all National League managers from the years 2004, 2005, and 2006. The
inverse of the resulting θ from the maximization problem with Charlie Manuel’s 2005
season as the evaluated observation is his technical efficiency for that year. These
efficiencies are calculated for each manager in the American and National League with
more than five consecutive games managed for the years 1986 to 2005 and are used in the
subsequent survival analysis. A ranking of managers in terms of efficiency is listed in the
following table. The reported technical efficiencies are game weighted averages from the
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years 1986 through 2005 for all managers with at least 200 games managed within the
sample.
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Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42

Manager
Ron Gardenhire
John Boles
Bobby Cox
Ken Macha
Ned Yost
Jack McKeon
Bruce Bochy
Larry Dierker
Eric Wedge
Jim Leyland
Felipe Alou
Don Zimmer
Bob Brenly
Marcel Lachemann
Art Howe
Dick Williams
Frank Robinson
Pete Rose
Mike Scioscia
Terry Francona
Lou Piniella
Gene Lamont
Larry Rothschild
Dusty Baker
Joe Torre
Buck Rodgers
Tony LaRussa
Grady Little
Jerry Manuel
Bill Russell
Bud Harrelson
Kevin Kennedy
Bobby Valentine
Tom Trebelhorn
Hal Lanier
Mike Hargrove
Don Baylor
Terry Collins
Phil Garner
Jim Tracy
Bob Boone
Jim Fregosi
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Managers 1986-2005 (Minimum 200 Games)
Games in
Average
Sample
TE
Rank
Manager
647
1.0000
43
John Wathan
446
0.9996
44
Jimy Williams
2460
0.9868
45
Tom Kelly
486
0.9689
46
Buck Showalter
485
0.9666
47
Ray Knight
1356
0.9516
48
Jim Lefebvre
1764
0.9462
49
Hal McRae
810
0.9390
50
Johnny Oates
486
0.9372
51
Charlie Manuel
2202
0.9354
52
Doc Edwards
1893
0.9310
53
Joe Morgan
524
0.9289
54
Buddy Bell
565
0.9283
55
Davey Johnson
331
0.9269
56
Cito Gaston
2266
0.9258
57
Jeff Torborg
351
0.9199
58
Greg Riddoch
1164
0.9166
59
Doug Rader
236
0.9131
60
Larry Bowa
972
0.9029
61
Lloyd McClendon
972
0.8985
62
Davey Lopes
2939
0.8975
63
Bob Melvin
1115
0.8968
64
Rene Lachemann
499
0.8956
65
Carlos Tosca
2042
0.8937
66
Tony Muser
2324
0.8935
67
Terry Bevington
313
0.8934
68
Butch Hobson
3090
0.8920
69
Clint Hurdle
324
0.8869
70
Dave Miley
971
0.8864
71
Buck Martinez
322
0.8857
72
Nick Leyva
274
0.8844
73
Jim Riggleman
582
0.8830
74
John McNamara
1003
0.8826
75
Dallas Green
932
0.8713
76
Tony Pena
486
0.8687
77
Alan Trammell
2123
0.8671
78
Gene Michael
1317
0.8666
79
Russ Nixon
907
0.8622
80
Lee Elia
1748
0.8616
81
Jerry Narron
810
0.8613
82
Ray Miller
815
0.8605
83
Stump Merrill
1637
0.8585
84
Chuck Tanner

Games in
Sample
646
1701
2386
1554
261
859
872
1544
573
380
563
919
1027
1319
994
394
448
853
782
340
486
506
382
748
437
439
626
289
215
338
1085
267
633
483
486
238
347
254
389
324
275
361

Average
TE
0.8567
0.8564
0.8540
0.8534
0.8512
0.8507
0.8496
0.8490
0.8489
0.8486
0.8474
0.8443
0.8418
0.8411
0.8398
0.8366
0.8338
0.8297
0.8122
0.8057
0.8054
0.8044
0.8023
0.7994
0.7914
0.7887
0.7845
0.7803
0.7780
0.7746
0.7722
0.7587
0.7584
0.7497
0.7446
0.7420
0.7222
0.7200
0.7177
0.7027
0.6905
0.6622

Survival Analysis
The goal of this paper is to determine whether race has a significant impact on the
probability of a manager surviving to the next season. This can be accomplished through
the use of survival time analysis. Survival time analysis examines the relationship
between the time to an event and several characteristics, referred to as covariates. The
goal of survival analysis is to estimate a survival function which gives the probability of
survival to a certain time period given a set of covariates. These covariates can be
constant over time, such as minority status, or varying each period, such as winning
percentage.
Survival time analysis can be done by making distributional assumptions about
the survival function. Models which use this method are referred to as parametric
models. The first step to estimating such models is to estimate the hazard rate as a
function of the covariates. The hazard rate is simply the drop out rate in a given time
period conditional on a set of covariates. This rate is always positive so the model is
assumed to be linear in the log of the hazard rate. Therefore, the model of interest is the
following.
log(hi) = B0 + B1Xi1 + B2Xi2 + … + BnXin
As can be seen this model does not depend on time. Therefore, it assumes that the
hazard rate is constant over time. This leads to a survival function of the following form.
S(t) = e-ht
This model is referred to as the exponential survival model and is the most simplistic of
the commonly used models due to its assumption of a constant hazard rate over time.
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The assumption that the hazard rate is constant over time is often inappropriate
and therefore models which allow for the hazard rate to vary over time may be more
appropriate. The most common parametric forms of these models are the Weibull and
Gompertz models. These models assume that there is some underlying hazard rate which
is dependent on time. It is also assumed that there is no interaction between time and the
covariates.

The covariates effect the hazard rate by proportionally changing the

underlying rate for a given time period. This is why these models are referred to as
parametric proportional hazards models. Mathematically the hazard rate is modeled as
follows.
h(t) = h0(t)exp(B0 + B1Xi1 + B2Xi2 + … + BnXin)
Different functional forms of h0(t) will lead to different survival functions. The
underlying hazard rate is commonly assumed to have a Weibull distribution. This leads
to the following form for the survival function.
S(t) = e-(ht)p
This is desirable as the hazard rate will be either increasing or decreasing monotonically
with time depending on the value of the estimated parameter p. If p is greater than 1 the
hazard rate is increasing over time. If p is less than 1 the hazard rate is decreasing over
time. As can be seen if p is equal to 1 this leads to the exponential model where the
hazard rate is constant over time.
Another distributional assumption which may be appropriate is the Gompertz
distribution. If the underlying hazard is assumed to follow a Gompertz distribution the
resulting survival function is of the following form.
S(t) = exp[(h/r)(1-ert)]
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Under this assumption the hazard rate will either increase or decrease at an exponential
rate depending on the value of the estimated parameter r. These three distributional
assumptions can be used to estimate a hazard rate which is constant over time, increasing
over time, and increasing exponentially over time. These three models are estimated
using maximum likelihood and the results are presented in the next section.
An alternative approach to these parametric models is to estimate a Cox
proportional hazards model. In order to estimate this model the ratio of hazards for two
observations is taken as follows.
hi(t)/hj(t) = h0(t)exp(B0 + B1Xi1 + … + BnXin) / h0(t)exp(B0 + B1Xj1 + … + BnXjn)
hi(t)/hj(t) = exp(B0 + B1Xi1 + … + BnXin) / exp(B0 + B1Xj1 + … + BnXjn)
Due to the fact that the baseline hazards are independent of the covariates the baseline
hazards cancel leaving a hazard ratio which is independent of time. Despite the fact that
the underlying hazard function is not defined the model can still be estimated by the
method of partial likelihood. This method is presented by Cox in the 1972 paper in
which he first introduces the Cox model. While these models are not as efficient as a
correctly specified parametric model they do not depend on distributional assumptions.
This avoids the risk of obtaining misleading results due to an incorrectly specified
parametric model. A Cox proportional hazards model is estimated in addition to the three
parametric models and the results are presented in the following section.
Estimation Results
The data on Major League Baseball managers from 1986 to 2005 consist of 573
observations for which the individuals managed more than 5 consecutive games. These
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observations are used to construct managerial streaks which range in duration from less
than one season to 16 seasons. In order to avoid any left censoring issues only streaks
which began from 1986 on are included in the analysis. This results in a sample of 180
managerial streaks.

Minority managers account for 24 of these streaks which are

distributed between 16 different teams.

Using the performance and personal

characteristic variables as covariates the four survival time models previously discussed
are estimated.

These models are estimated for numerous different combinations of

covariates in order to determine which variables have a statistically significant effect on
survival time. The estimation results with all variables included are presented below.
Estimation Results With All Variables Included

Minority
Efficiency
Winning %
Playoff Wins
Experience
2
Experience
Age
2
Age
p
r

Exponential
Hazard
P-Value
Ratio
0.7069960
0.166
0.0795495
0.007
0.9998889
0.945
0.9629778
0.404
0.9999485
0.877
0.9999999
0.499
1.033812
0.788
1.000021
0.986
-

Weibull
P-Value
Hazard Ratio
0.5330281
0.014
0.0536909
0.002
1.000437
0.791
0.9597056
0.368
0.9985763
0.000
1.000000
0.115
0.9786913
0.867
1.000730
0.549
1.898794
-

Gompertz
Hazard
P-Value
Ratio
0.5996457
0.046
0.0468547
0.002
1.000668
0.687
0.9678998
0.472
0.9994366
0.104
0.9999999
0.569
1.000140
0.999
1.000473
0.694
0.18272

Cox Prop. Hazards
Hazard
P-Value
Ratio
0.6385576
0.078
0.0731800
0.006
1.000088
0.957
0.9622753
0.399
0.9995162
0.192
1.000000
0.854
1.035281
0.780
1.000043
0.971
-

Under all but one model specification the coefficients on age squared and
experience squared are statistically insignificant at any conventional level. Additionally,
for most model specifications the squared terms have the same sign as experience and
age. Therefore, it is concluded that age and experience do not have diminishing effects
and the squared terms are dropped from the final model.
Winning percentage does have the anticipated positive effect on survival under all
specifications.
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However, this effect becomes highly insignificant when technical

efficiency is added to the model. Without technical efficiency the coefficient on winning
percentage has a p-value of less than .001. When technical efficiency is added to the
model, this p-value jumps to over .6 for all of the model specifications. This implies that
winning percentage does not provide any additional information to the model when
technical efficiency is included. .
Similarly, playoff wins have the anticipated positive effect on survival. However,
for most specifications this effect is not significant at conventional levels. As with
winning percentage, for all specifications playoff wins become highly insignificant when
technical efficiency is included in the model.
Winning percentage and playoff wins are both correlated with managerial
efficiency with correlation coefficients of .75 and .27 respectively. This correlation may
be contributing to their insignificance when efficiency is included in the model.
However, the inclusion or exclusion of these variables does not significantly change the
magnitude or significance of the coefficient on the variable of interest, minority status.
Therefore, winning percentage and post season wins are excluded from the final model
chosen.
The exponential, Weibell, Gompertz, and Cox proportional hazards models are
estimated with technical efficiency, age, experience, and minority status as covariates.
The resulting hazard ratios and p-values are presented below. A hazard ratio greater than
1 implies that that covariate has a positive impact on the baseline hazard rate. A hazard
ratio of less than 1 implies that that covariate has a negative impact on the baseline
hazard rate.
Estimation Results for the Selected Model
Exponential
P-Value
Hazard
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Weibull
P-Value
Hazard

Gompertz
P-Value
Hazard

Cox Prop. Hazards
P-Value
Hazard

Minority
Efficiency
Experience
Age
p
r

Ratio
0.71391
0.07379
0.99972
1.03797

0.176
0.000
0.031
0.007
-

Ratio
0.52267
0.011
0.06400
0.000
0.99908
0.000
1.05566
0.000
1.830658
-

Ratio
0.60326
0.06786
0.99926
1.05202

0.047
0.000
0.000
0.000

0.181839

Ratio
0.63369
0.07293
0.99956
1.04072

0.072
0.000
0.006
0.005
-

As can be seen in the regression results all of the covariates are statistically
significant at the 5 percent level with the exception of minority status for the exponential
and Cox models where it is significant at the 18 and 8 percent levels respectively. The
results are also similar in sign and magnitude for all four models. Minority status,
efficiency, and experience all appear to increase the probability of survival while age has
a negative effect on the probability of survival.
In order to evaluate which model is most appropriate the survival functions for all
four models are plotted along with the Kaplan-Meier survival function. The KaplanMeier survival function is a description of the observed survival rates which treats
observations for which no failure is ever observed as having survived in the last period
they are observed. However, it does not include these observations in the number of
observations which are subject to failure in the next period. The survival probabilities for
each period are then used to calculate the probability of survival past a given period as a
compound conditional probability.

This survival function can be interpreted as the

observed survival function against which models should be compared.
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Clearly the Cox proportional hazards model does the best job of approximating
the Kaplan Meier survival function. Under this model all covariates are significant at the
1 percent level except for minority status which is significant at the 8 percent level.
Specification Tests
While the advantage of the Cox model is that it does not rely on distributional
assumptions about the survival function, the assumption of proportional hazards must be
tested before the Cox model is accepted as appropriate. One test of this assumption is to
estimate the model with interaction terms of time and each covariate included in the
model. If any of these interaction terms are statistically significant it is evidence that they
violate the assumption of proportional hazards.
Cox Prop. Hazards
Hazard Ratio
P-Value
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Minority
Efficiency
Experience
Age
t*Minority
t*Efficiency
t*Experience
t*Age

0.49310
0.13248
0.99971
1.04297
1.06696
0.78124
0.99996
0.99864

0.169
0.008
0.297
0.090
0.634
0.362
0.573
0.853

The p-values on all four interaction terms are greater than .3. This does not
provide any evidence against the assumption of proportional hazards. Another test of
whether the assumption of proportional hazards is violated is to run a generalized linear
regression of the scaled Schoenfeld residuals on time. As with the previous test a
significant coefficient on time for any of the covariates is evidence that the proportional
hazards assumption is violated. Graphically, this is equivalent to having slopes equal to
zero in the graphs of these regressions.
Test of proportional hazards assumption
rho
P-Value
Minority
0.04675
0.562
Efficiency
-0.05657
0.591
Experience
-0.08468
0.290
Age
0.00909
0.914
Global Test
0.677
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The coefficient on time is highly insignificant for all covariates individually and
jointly. This result is consistent with the lack of slope in the graphs of the residuals
versus time.

Therefore, there is no evidence that the proportionality assumption is

violated and the Cox proportional hazards model is appropriate.
Given the observed statistically significant relationship between minority status
and survival, it is also possible that the covariates affect minorities differently than white
managers. In order to test this hypothesis, interaction terms of minority status with
efficiency, experience, and age are added to the models previously estimated. It is found
that the coefficients on these interaction terms are insignificant at conventional levels for
all model specifications. Therefore, it is concluded that the covariates do not affect
minorities differently and the previously estimated model is appropriate.
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Conclusions
The model selected is a Cox proportional hazards model with minority status,
efficiency, experience, and age as covariates.

In this model managerial efficiency

increases the likelihood of survival as expected and is significant at a confidence level of
less than 1 percent. It is interesting to note that winning percentage and playoff wins are
highly insignificant when added to the model. This implies that it is not important how
many games a manager wins but rather how well he converts his given resources into
wins. This makes sense as owners of teams are expected to maximize profits not wins.
Therefore, they will retain a manager with low wins if that manager did the best possible
with his given resources.
Experience also increases the probability of a manager returning the following
season. This is to be expected as experience managing will add knowledge to a manager
increasing his human capital. The more human capital a manager possesses the less
likely it is that someone more qualified can be found to replace him. Unlike experience,
age decreases the probability that a manager will return the next season. This is not
surprising as older managers are more likely to retire. It is also likely that older managers
will be unable to relate to players who are significantly younger. The added experience
from age is also likely captured by the experience term resulting in an overall negative
relationship between age and the probability of returning.
The chosen model estimates a positive relationship between minority status and
survival. This impact is significant at the 8 percent level. To see the impact of minority
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status on managerial retention the estimated survival function is plotted with minority
equal to zero and one. The other covariates are evaluated at their sample mean.
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As can be seen in the preceding graph and table, being a minority increases the
probability of returning the next season. On average during the first ten seasons of tenure
minority status increases the probability of retention by 9.6 percentage points. This effect
is substantial and statistically significant with a p-value of .072. The positive relationship
between minority status and survival also appears to be robust to different model
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specifications and combinations of variables. This result leads to the conclusion that
minority status does not decrease the probability of a manager returning. Rather, there is
significant evidence that minority status actually increases the probability of retention.
Therefore, the current decrease in the number of minority managers is not due to
discrimination in the retention decision.
While the analysis presented here finds no discrimination in the decision to keep a
current manager, the results may be motivated by discrimination in hiring. If there is
discrimination against minorities in the hiring of major league managers, then only the
most highly qualified minorities will become managers.

Therefore, the minority

managers who have the possibility of not returning may possess some unobserved
characteristic which enabled them to overcome the discrimination in hiring. It is likely
that this unobserved characteristic may also make the manager less likely to be fired and
thus cause the relationship observed in this analysis. However, this analysis attempts to
account for all of the managers’ characteristics by controlling for performance,
experience, and age. After justifying the included variables and the appropriateness of
the model this analysis concludes that the relatively low number of minority managers in
the major leagues is not due to a lower probability of survival.
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